Abstract: The egalitarian solution for TU-games as introduced by Dutta and Ray 3 is studied. Five c haracterizations of the restriction of this solution to the class of convex games are given. They all involve a stability property due to the concept of the equal division core from Selten 8 and all but the third characterization involve a property restricting maximum payo s. The rst two c haracterizations use in addition e ciency and the reduced game properties of Hart and Mas-Colell 6 and Davis and Maschler 5 , respectively. The fourth and fth characterization only need in addition weak variants of the reduced game properties mentioned above. The third characterization involves besides the stability condition, e ciency and a new consistency property.
Introduction
Dutta and Ray 3 introduced the egalitarian solution as a solution concept for TU-games. This solution uni es the two con icting concepts of individualistic utility maximization and the social goal of equality. Under certain conditions it is non-empty, and then its outcome is unique, namely it is the Lorenz maximal element of the set of payo s satisfying core-like participation constraints. If the egalitarian solution exists, then every other feasible allocation for the grand coalition is either blocked, or is Lorenz dominated by some allocation which, in turn, is not blocked. We refer to Dutta and Ray 3 for the details. For convex games Dutta and Ray 3 describe an algorithm to locate the unique egalitarian solution, and they show, in addition, that it is in the core. Nevertheless, for balanced games, which h a ve a non-empty core, the egalitarian solution might not even exist.
Dutta and Ray 4 consider a parallel concept, the S-constrained egalitarian solution, which is not a singleton in general. The construction of the S-constrained egalitarian solution is identical to the egalitarian solution mentioned above, except that in the concept of blocking it is required that every member of the blocking coalition is strictly better o rather than at least one member, as is the case for the original egalitarian solution. They show that in contrast to the original egalitarian solution, S-constrained egalitarian solutions exist under very mild conditions on the game. The two solutions are not completely unrelated, since, for example, for convex games either the egalitarian solution is the unique S-constrained egalitarian allocation or every S-constrained egalitarian allocation Lorenz-dominates the egalitarian solution.
Dutta 2 characterizes the egalitarian solution over the class of convex games. The properties used are the reduced game properties due to Hart and Mas-Colell 6 and Davis and Maschler 5 . The egalitarian solution is the only solution concept satisfying either of the two reduced game properties and constrained egalitarianism, which is a prescriptive property o n t wo person games.
Arin and Iñarra 1 introduce another solution concept that embodies a`bilaterally egalitarian' notion. Their solution concept is called the egalitarian set. They characterize this multi-valued solution over the class of all TU-games by extended constrained egalitarianism, the Davis-Maschler reduced game property, and the converse Davis-Maschler reduced game property. Moreover, they prove that it is non-empty for the class of balanced games. They show in addition that there is nevertheless no solution on the class of balanced games satisfying non-emptiness, extended constrained egalitarianism, and the Hart and Mas-Colell reduced game property. Arin and Iñarra 1 show that in general the egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray 3 does not satisfy the Davis-Maschler reduced game property, nor the Hart and Mas-Colell reduced game property. Finally, Arin and Iñarra 1 show that the egalitarian solution belongs to the egalitarian set, and that for convex games it even coincides with the latter.
Given the results above that for the class of convex games the egalitarian solution exists and coincides with the egalitarian set, we w ould like to reconsider the egalitarian solution on the class of convex games.
In this paper we provide ve c haracterizations of the egalitarian solution, without directly making use of Dutta's 2 prescriptive property constrained egalitarianism on twoperson games. All ve c haracterizations involve a stability property due to the concept of the equal division core from Selten 8 and all but the third characterization involve a property restricting maximum payo s. The rst two c haracterizations use in addition e ciency and a reduced game property, more speci cally, the reduced game property of Hart and Mas-Colell 6 and the reduced game property o f D a vis and Maschler 5 , respectively. The fourth and fth characterization only need in addition weak variants of the reduced game properties mentioned above. Here, weak means that we only look at the reduced game where the players receiving most have been sent a way. The third characterization uses besides the stability property due to the concept of the equal division core from Selten 8 e ciency and another consistency property.
The stability property due to the concept of the equal division core from Selten 8 , called equal division stability, states that for any convex game and for any coalition there is some player in this coalition that gets at least the average of the value of the coalition in the game. Clearly, a n y core-allocation satis es this property. The intuitive reasoning behind this property is spelled out in Selten 8 . The principle of equal division is a strong distributive norm which in uences the behavior of the players. The attention of the players is attracted by coalitions with high equal shares. This is con rmed by the great number of cases of experimental games in Selten 8 in which the outcome is such that there is no coalition that can divide its value equally among its members giving all of them more than in the original outcome.
The second property, concerning the boundedness of the payo s, states that the payo s of the players receiving most is bounded by imposing the condition that the sum of payo s of these players does not exceed the value of the players in the game. This might b e desirable from a social point of view.
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with notation and de nitions regarding TU-games and recalls the egalitarian solution for convex games. In section 3 we provide several characterizations of this solution concept.
Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utilities TU-game is a pair N;v, where N = f1; : : : ; n g is the player set and v the characteristic function, which assigns to every Throughout this paper we will denote the average worth of coalition S in game N;v by aS; v : = vS jSj :
We will recall the algorithm of Dutta and Ray 3 to locate the egalitarian solution for convex games. In every step of the algorithm a cooperative game is considered. The set of players in this game is the set of players that have not received a payo yet. The largest coalition with the highest average worth is selected and the players in this coalition receive this average worth.
Let N;v b e a c o n vex TU-game. De ne N 1 := N and v 1 := v.
Step In this section we provide several characterizations of the egalitarian solution for convex games. The rst two c haracterizations are based on characterizations of Dutta 2 in the sense that we replace a prescriptive property o n t wo-person games by some other properties. The third characterization uses a new consistency property, whereas the last two characterizations strengthen the rst two c haracterizations by w eakening the respective consistency properties and not demanding e ciency a priori. Our rst characterization of the egalitarian solution for convex TU-games involves the properties e ciency, equal division stability, bounded maximum payo property, and HM consistency. W e describe these properties below. Let C be the set of convex TUgames. A solution on C is a map assigning to each convex game N;v 2 C an element EDS plays a role in the concept of equal division core from Selten 8 . BMPP states that the payo s of the players receiving most is bounded, which might be desirable from a social point of view. HMC is the well-known consistency property of Hart and Mas-Colell 6 . Dutta 2 characterizes the egalitarian solution with HMC and CE.
Theorem 3.1 shows that we can replace the prescriptive property CE by the properties EFF, EDS, and BMPP. But rst we prove t wo lemmas. Proof. Let Proof. First we show that E satis es the properties.
Since E assigns to every convex game a core element, it satis es EFF and EDS. It follows from 1 that every player in S 1 receives the maximum payo and that all other players receive less than this maximum. Since these players divide vS 1 it follows that E satis es BMPP. From Dutta 2 it follows that E satis es the reduced game property of Hart and Mas-Colell 6 .
Suppose a solution satis es the four properties in the theorem. Then, by lemma 3.2 also satis es CE. Then, by Dutta's 2 characterization with CE and HMC it immediately follows that = E. 2
The previous characterization still holds true if we replace the consistency property Before we prove the characterization we prove another lemma. 
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We can now prove the third characterization.
Proof. Since from the algorithm of the egalitarian solution it immediately follows that E satis es MC, we prove the "only if"-part. Suppose that a solution satis es the properties. We prove that = E. The proof will be by induction on the number of players.
Clearly, for convex games N;v with jNj = 1 w e h a ve that N;v = vf1g = EN;v b y lemma 3.3. Suppose that for some p DM max-consistency DMMC is de ned similar to HMMC but with the reduced game de ned in property DMC. So, HMMC and DMMC are weak variants of HMC and DMC, respectively. This restriction is quite natural since the players receiving most are the players that might h a ve the greatest incentive t o w alk away from the grand coalition.
Thus, our fourth and fth characterization of the egalitarian solution are as follows. The solution that equally divides the worth of the grand coalition to the players satis es BMPP, HMMC, and BMMC, but does not satisfy EDS. The Shapley value satis es EDS and HMMC see Hart and Mas-Colell 6 , but not BMPP. Sobolev 9 showed that the prenucleolus satis es DMMC. Furthermore, the prenucleolus belongs to the core for convex games and hence it satis es EDS. Finally, the prenucleolus does not satisfy BMPP. We will de ne the solution . Let S 1 be the coalition that is determined in the rst step of the algorithm to determine E. I f S 1 Then it can be checked that S 1 = f1g, E N;v = 10; 6; 4, and N;v = 10; 5; 5.
Hence, satis es neither HMMC nor DMMC. The main conclusion following from these examples is the following: considering EFF, EDS, BMPP, and HMMC DMMC, then obviously, theorem 3.4 implies that E can be characterized by these four properties. Furthermore, theorem 3.4 implies that E can be characterized omitting EFF, but the examples show that we cannot omit any of the other properties. Finally, note that theorem 3.4 strengthens theorems 3.1 and 3.2 by omitting e ciency and requiring only a weak consistency property.
